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In the Supreme Court 
o f the State o f Utah 
JERALD WIXOM GREAVES, \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1 
vs. > Case No. 13631 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Defendant-Appellant. I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was brought upon an action for 
declatory judgement pursuant to Utah Code An-
notated §78-33-1, 2 (1953), and filed against the State 
of Utah as Defendant alleging that Utah Code An-
notated §41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1973) and Utah Code An-
notated §41-2-18 (Supp. 1973) as it pertains to Utah 
Code Annotated §41-6-44.2 are unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the First Judicial District 
in and for the County of Cache, State of Utah, on 
February 26, 1974, Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2 
declared Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.2 (Supp. 
1973) unconstitutional. 
No ruling was issued regarding the con-
stitutionality of Utah Code Annotated §41-2-17 (Supp. 
1973). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the ruling of the 
Lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent adopts the Appellant's 
statement of the facts in its entirity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT 
SPECIFICALLY GROUND ITS DECISION 
UPON A LACK OF MEATS REA OR 
CRIMINAL INTENT. 
The clerks and attorneys for the Appellant have 
done an admirable job in research of the law, both case 
and statutory, and of secondary authority in defending 
and supporting Points I and II of their Argument. 
Despite Appellant's over emphasis of phrases such as 
"public welfare offenses," and the rationalization that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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such obviates and over rides the basic requirement of 
criminal element of intent, since any crime from 
murder to parking meter violations could reasonably 
be construed as public welfare offenses, the Lower 
Court simply did not specifically base its decision upon 
the statute's lack of mens rea element. 
For the Appellant to speculate as to the most 
"likely" interpretation of the Lower Court's decision 
and then argue their supposition is simply adding 
support to speculation and scatter-gunning in hopes of 
covering all possible targets. 
There is no question that times have changed, 
industrialization and automated mobility have 
spawned "undreamed of changes in the law, including 
criminal law. One such change is in the area of "public 
welfare offenses." The Appellant would have the 
Court believe that such will result in greater good for 
a greater number. This utilitarian approach could, if 
taken to its logical end result in complete deprivation 
of any rights and dignity held by the individual, 
whether enumerated in the Constitution or not. 
It is the position of the Respondent that the 
Lower Court did not specifically ground its decision 
upon the lack of mens rea or criminal intent in the 
statute in question, and will not respond to Appellants 
argument there of directly except to point out that the 
law as to whether criminal offenses require mens rea 
or the element of criminal intent is neither settled nor 
static and that the United State Supreme Court has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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been inconsistent in its declarations concerning the 
same. See Shelvin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 
U.S. 57 (1910); United States vs. Balint 258 U.S. 
250 (1922); United States vs. Dotterweich 320 U.S. 
277 (1943); Morisette vs. United States 342 U.S. 
246 (1952); Lambort vs. California 355 U.S. 225 (1957); 
Smith vs. California 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Robinson vs. 
California 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell vs. Texas 289 
U.S. 514 (1968); Papachistor vs. City of Jacksonville 
92 S. Ct. 839 (1972). 
Although the lack of intent was not the anchor of 
the Lower Courts decision, and the law is anything but 
settled in the area, if Appellant's Point II is correct, 
then its argument in Point I is moot. 
The Appellant's argument in Point II appears 
essentially to state that Utah Code Annotated §41-6-
44.2 (Supp. 1973) is not a strict liability crime by 
definition, and therefore falls into a category of of-
fenses, the mens rea of which are supplied by Utah 
Code Annotated §76-2-101 et. seq. 
Appellant concludes his argument in Point II 
with the statement that "Thus, the Lower Court 
judge's declaration that the statute is unconstitutional 
for lack of an intent element is untenable." That 
conclusion is untenable simply because the Lower 
Court did not specifically declare the statute un-
constitutional for lack of an intent element. The 
Appellant admittedly only conjectures that such was 
the Lower Court's basis for its decision. 
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POINT II 
Point III of Appellant's argument is not unlike 
its Points I and II in not being based upon the Lower 
Court's decision. The Lower Court discussed in the 
opinion that the statute must provide a relationship 
between the persons blood alcohol content of .10 
percent and some act of the person charged. 
The Appellant supposes, again not unlike its 
suppositions of its first two points, that the Lower 
Court is discussing actus reas and then points out that 
the actus reas is the state of being in physical control 
of a vehicle. The Lower Court's decision speaks for 
itself in stating that the relationship it requires is one 
concerning the taking or consumption of intoxicating 
liquor and the alcohol content of the person's blood. 
Again, as in the Appellant's Points I and II, 
Appellant erroneously concludes that the Lower Court 
pivoted its decision of something other than what was 
stated by the Court. 
POINT III 
SECTION 41-6-44.2, SUPRA IS VOID AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Although on its face, as the Appellant aptly points 
out, section 41-6-44.2 supra is not vague and is worded 
in clear, unambiguous language but when enforced 
through Utah Code Annotated, 41-2-18-(a)(3)(1953) it 
works to deny the person charged the right to operate 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a motor vehicle without regard as to his ability to 
operate the vehicle. 
Therein lies that statute's vagueness in not 
specifying the basis upon which the denial is made. 
Once the person charged obtains a right to drive 
through acquiring a driver's license; the procedure by 
which it may be revoked or suspended requires a fair 
hearing. Bell vs. Burton 40 L U.S. 535 (1971) and 
unless that hearing is regarding his ability to operate a 
motor vehicle, it does not afford him due process as to 
that right. 
The only thing a hearing on Section 41-6-44.2 
(1953) determines is whether in fact the person's 
blood-alcohol reading was over the .10 percent level. 
The Supreme Court in Vlandis vs. Kline 37 L. ed. 2nd; 
6341 Law Week 4796 (1973) and cases cited therein 
stated that absolute presumptions are highly 
disfavored. The reason is obvious, because they deny 
the person charged any defense, whether valid or not. 
The statute in question further violates the 
Respondent's right to due process by establishing a 
standard which is impossible for Respondent to 
ascertain in advance and makes a violation thereof a 
crime with serious, criminal or economic sanctions. 
The argument that difficulty in proving drunk 
driving cases justifies this type of statute points out 
the problem that the Respondent also does not know 
when the violation has occurred until after the tests 
have been given (see Bell, supra, a policy of law vs. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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substance of due process). All blood-alcohol tests given 
in our area are sophisticated and require skilled and 
trained administrators. It is not like a speedometer 
which is readily visible. This, coupled witfi ^the 
problem that alcohol effects different people in dif-
ferent ways under different circumstances, means a 
person may be at a statutory level without any 
knowledge or warning thereof and in fact, still be 
perfectly confident to operate a vehicle. Further 
problems come from the fact that alcohol content of 
each drinker is not the same; levels and quantities to 
reach a blood-alcohol level with each person differs, 
and permissible blood-alcohol level vary in each state. 
The statute in question denies the Respondent 
herein equal protection under the law in that it estab-
lishes an arbitrary class in criminal conduct, the inclu-
sion therewith denies the Respondent a basic right 
to travel. Our courts have sustained classifications 
when reasonable. The Supreme Court has made 
justification more stringent where the inclusions 
within the class denies a basic right. The Supreme 
Court has held the right to travel is such a basic right 
and therefore the burden becomes extremely heavy on 
the state that shows justification for denial. It is 
submitted that an absolute and automatic inclusion of 
everyone into a class as criminals and whose driving 
privileges are revoked for one year because of blood-
alcohol content as .10 percent is not only arbitrary 
inclusion, but violates the basic right of travel in that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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conviction deprives the member of the class to operate 
the motor vehicle for one year, not for just 30 or 90 
days as in many states. A revocation of Respondent's 
drivers license upon the arbitrary, unconstitutional 
law as this deprives him his right to travel outside the 
State of Utah, although he may have obtained a 
conditional license in order to travel to and from work, 
such a license is not recognized in sister states of Idaho 
and Wyoming. 
Respondent is aware that the statues involved are 
intended to protect the public from consequences of 
drunken automobile drivers on public highways. Such 
protection can and must be provided without 
deprevation of constitutional rights. Appellant seems 
preoccupied by the fact that personal hardship has no 
bearing upon the issue as to a persons right to drive an 
automobile. Such may be the case, but it is not 
Respondent's contention that personal hardship is the 
reason for unconstitutionality of the above cited 
statutes. The above cited statutes are unconstitutional 
because they deny the Respondent his constitutional 
right to equal protection, due process of a law and his 
right to travel without a due process hearing thereon. 
POINT IV 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS THE POWER TO 
REGULATE AND PUNISH CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT. 
Respondent has no argument that the Legislature 
has the power to regulate use of the highways and 
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make unlawful the act of operating a motor vehicle by 
a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
Nor does Respondent contend that intoxicated 
drivers are a danger to the public and that the 
Legislature passed Section 41-6-44.2 supra in an 
attempt to reduce alcohol related highway accidents. 
It is not contended here that a blood-alcohol test is 
not an accurate method of determining alcohol content 
in the blood. 
The Appellant goes to great lengths in Point V of 
its argument to point out that .10 percent blood-
alcohol content can be dangerously intoxicating, and 
even that Europeans feel that the United States is 
"ludicrously liberal" in its standards. 
With the information and arguments for the .10 
percent standard and against intoxicated drivers, the 
Respondent takes no exception. But the issue is 
whether the statute passed by the Legislature, ad-
mittedly based upon reason is constitutional. 
It is the Respondent's position that had the 
statute included the basis upon which the Legislature 
passed it as used in connection with Section 41-2-18 (a) 
(3) (1953) supra, or provided the Respondent with the 
opportunity of a hearing as to his ability to drive 
before his license is automatically revoked, the statute 
could stand. Without the above, all the rationalizations 
and supporting evidence the Legislature may have 
considered cannot justify the denial of Respondent his 
constitutional rights without a due process hearing. 
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POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT VIOLATE 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE NOR DID THE LOWER 
COURT ABUSE HIS DESCRETION. 
The Apellant contends in Point VI of its 
argument that the Lo^er Court violated the rules of 
Civil Procedure by operating what appears to be, 
though not specifically designated as, a summary 
judgement for the Respondent. 
It is admitted by the Respondent that the Lower 
Court's procedure in this case is out of the ordinary 
and perhaps not what was expected. 
However, Appellant admits that its Rule 12 (b) (6) 
motion to dismiss could have been construed by the 
Lower Court under the rules (Rule 56, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure) as a motion for summary judgment. 
Had the Lower Court granted Appellant's motion as a 
motion for summary judgment based upon its motion 
and accompanying memorandum to dismiss, Appellant 
would have thought that fair, even though Respondent 
would have responded to the motion only as one to 
dismiss and not as one for summary judgment. The 
Lower Court's action is not out of the purview of the 
authority under rule 12 (b) (6) supra since the position 
of the parties were expressed through their motion 
and memoranda. It would have been only a formality 
for the Respondent to have labeled its response to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Appellant's motion a motion for summary judgment. 
Since Respondent was required to respond 
sufficiently to defend, had Appellant's motion been 
considered by the Lower Court as a motion for sum-
mary judgment, it puts no hardship upon the Ap-
pellant to prepare its motion and argument with that 
possibility also in mind. 
Appellant contends that the Lower Court denied 
the Appellant the opportunity of fully presenting its 
case and therefore violated Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in that the pleadings were not construed to 
do substantial justice. 
Respondent submits that the Appellant could 
have presented its argument more fully in its motion 
to dismiss had it wished to do so, and that the Ap-
pellant itself, and not the Lower Court must accept the 
responsibility for not having done so. Furthermore, 
had Appellant's motion been granted as a summary 
judgement, it is doubtful it would be argued that 
substantial justice was not done under Rule 8 supra. 
Appellant argues that Rule 13 (A) of the First 
District Court unfairly denies the Appellant a full 
hearing on the matter. 
The obvious problem with that argument is that 
the Appellant was not harmed thereby because it 
never requested an oral hearing and was therefore 
never denied one. Appellant admits that it did not 
read the Lower Court's local rules and now submits 
that even had it read them, it would have had to read 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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more than the heading only. Certainly reading the 
local rules cannot be too onerous a task for an office 
having the facilities and personnel of the Appellant. 
The Appellant has no standing to argue the 
fairness or unfairness of the Lower Court's rules since 
it did not bother to read them, nor was it denied a 
hearing because of them as a hearing was never 
requested by the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lower Court's finding that Section 41-6-
44.2 supra is unconstitutional should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON J. LOW 
Attorney for Respondent 
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